Who gets what in environmental policy?

Dirk J. Wolfson

Ecological Economics, 2014, vol. 102, issue C, 8-14

Abstract: This paper shows how anticipated impacts of environmental projects and policies can be valued in terms of money as a common denominator, and costs and benefits assigned in an acceptable distribution. To that effect, a new mechanism design of situational contracting is introduced that generates information on willingness and ability to pay or to cooperate, in a realization-focused capability approach to fairness. The situational contract reveals preferences and merit considerations of the relevant stakeholders and deals with market failure in a structured combination of political guidance, expert opinions and co-production.

Keywords: Environmental mechanism design; Targeting results; Fairness in distribution; Individual preference; Open access; Situational contracting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:102:y:2014:i:c:p:8-14

DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.03.003

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