Insiders, outsiders, and the role of local enforcement in forest management: An example from Tanzania

Elizabeth Robinson (), Heidi Albers, Guyslain Ngeleza () and Razack B. Lokina

Ecological Economics, 2014, vol. 107, issue C, 242-248

Abstract: In low-income countries, both nearby local villagers, “insiders”, and non-locals, “outsiders”, extract products from protected forests even though their actions are illegal. Forest managers typically combine enforcement and livelihood projects offered to nearby communities to reduce this illegal activity, but with limited budgets cannot deter all extraction. We develop a game theoretic model of a forest manager's decision interacting with the extraction decisions of insiders and outsiders. Our analysis suggests that, depending on the relative ecological damage caused by each group, budget-constrained forest managers may reduce total forest degradation by legalizing “insider” extraction in return for local villagers' involvement in enforcement activities against outsiders.

Keywords: Participatory forest management; Enforcement; Tanzania; Charcoal production; Non-timber forest products; Bee keeping; Livelihood projects; Energy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Insiders, Outsiders, and the Role of Local Enforcement in Forest Management: An Example from Tanzania (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:107:y:2014:i:c:p:242-248

DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.08.004

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