Unraveling the effects of payments for ecosystem services on motivations for collective action

Estelle Midler, Unai Pascual, Adam G. Drucker, Ulf Narloch and José Luis Soto

Ecological Economics, 2015, vol. 120, issue C, 394-405

Abstract: This paper addresses the differential impacts on decisions towards collective action in the context of payments for ecosystem services (PES) where individual and collective rewards are conditional on a minimum collective conservation level being achieved. Interactions between the different reward types, farmers' social preferences, social ties and communication are identified. A field game experiment is conducted with Andean farmers in Peru and framed around their decisions to conserve agrobiodiversity as an impure public good. The main results are that PES schemes could be effective in motivating collective action for agrobiodiversity conservation and that individual rewards are likely to be more effective and less sensitive to social factors than collective rewards. The latter might have a positive effect on conservation when they are shared within socially closely-related groups or in situations where communication and deliberation about collective action are possible.

Keywords: Cooperation; Public goods; Field experiment; Agricultural biodiversity; Crowding effects; Communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 H23 Q57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (41)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:120:y:2015:i:c:p:394-405

DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.04.006

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