Does Might Make Right? An Experiment on Assigning Property Rights
Hans J. Czap,
Natalia V. Czap,
Mark E. Burbach and
Gary D. Lynne
Ecological Economics, 2018, vol. 150, issue C, 229-240
This paper investigates the role of property rights in environmental decisions and choices regarding the distribution of income in a downstream water pollution problem. The results confirm that who owns the property rights is a significant determinant of these decisions. More specifically, under certain conditions a property rights owner who suffers the consequences of negative externalities acts, on average, more environmentally friendly than a property rights owner who causes such negative externality. Similarly, when it comes to the distribution of income, the property rights owners who cause negative externalities allocate on average a larger share of the income to themselves.
Keywords: negative externality; property rights; water pollution; environmental experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:150:y:2018:i:c:p:229-240
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