Does Might Make Right? An Experiment on Assigning Property Rights

Hans J. Czap, Natalia V. Czap, Mark E. Burbach and Gary Lynne

Ecological Economics, 2018, vol. 150, issue C, 229-240

Abstract: This paper investigates the role of property rights in environmental decisions and choices regarding the distribution of income in a downstream water pollution problem. The results confirm that who owns the property rights is a significant determinant of these decisions. More specifically, under certain conditions a property rights owner who suffers the consequences of negative externalities acts, on average, more environmentally friendly than a property rights owner who causes such negative externality. Similarly, when it comes to the distribution of income, the property rights owners who cause negative externalities allocate on average a larger share of the income to themselves.

Keywords: negative externality; property rights; water pollution; environmental experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:150:y:2018:i:c:p:229-240

DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.03.007

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