Strategic behavior and dynamic externalities in commercial fisheries
Anna Klis and
Richard Melstrom ()
Ecological Economics, 2020, vol. 169, issue C
This paper uses game theory to analyze commercial fishers’ willingness to practice conservation to recover a depleted fishery. We compare a game in which players choose their conservation effort simultaneously to a game in which there is a leader and a follower. We show that because the players ignore the effect of their conservation effort on the other player's expected benefits, their collective effort is suboptimal. When the players choose their effort sequentially, the leader puts less effort in conservation, reducing the likelihood of recovery and collective welfare.
Keywords: Bioeconomics; Game theory; Cooperation; Overfishing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:169:y:2020:i:c:s0921800919307840
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