 Importer's risk, smuggling and the role of incentives in the management of animal diseasesMarija Pavleska and William Kerr Ecological Economics, 2020, vol. 175, issue C Abstract: Provisions for regionalization in the case of infectious diseases were included in the World Trade Organization in 1995, but after >20 years it has seen little uptake, primarily because importing countries have not accepted exporting countries' assurances regarding disease-free zones. Given the potential trade benefits, the failure to achieve acceptance for disease-free zones suggests revisiting regionalization. The current approach relies on physical barriers to the movement of infected animals or products taking no account of incentives. Restrictions on movement between infected and disease free areas lead to price declines in the infected area. Price disparity between the regions leads to an incentive for commercial and casual smuggling and, hence, the unwillingness to accept the disease free sub-national zone of the exporting country. This paper demonstrates that strict control and monitoring measures are unlikely to eliminate smuggling. A price support policy proposal is developed, which would remove the incentive to smuggle. Keywords: Animal diseases; International trade; Price disparity; Smuggling (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:175:y:2020:i:c:s0921800919317410 DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106672 Access Statistics for this article Ecological Economics is currently edited by C. J. Cleveland More articles in Ecological Economics from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.