Volatility-reducing biodiversity conservation under strategic interactions

Emmanuelle Augeraud-Véron, Giorgio Fabbri and Katheline Schubert

Ecological Economics, 2021, vol. 190, issue C

Abstract: How can decentralized individual decisions inefficiently reduce the ability of biodiversity to mitigate ecological and environmental variability and then its “natural insurance” role? In this article we present a simple theoretical set-up to address this question and to evaluate some policy options.

Keywords: Biodiversity; Insurance value; Land conversion; Recursive preferences; Stochastic differential games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D62 O13 O20 Q10 Q15 Q56 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Volatility-reducing biodiversity conservation under strategic interactions (2021)
Working Paper: Volatility-reducing biodiversity conservation under strategic interactions (2021)
Working Paper: Volatility-Reducing Biodiversity Conservation Under Strategic Interactions (2020)
Working Paper: Volatility-reducing biodiversity conservation under strategic interactions (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:190:y:2021:i:c:s0921800921002524

DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2021.107193

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