Self-image and the stability of international environmental agreements

Michèle Breton and Lucia Sbragia

Ecological Economics, 2023, vol. 211, issue C

Abstract: In this paper we examine the stability of international environmental agreements about a (common) emissions target. By signing the agreement, the parties develop a sense of responsibility to the commitment made, gaining a self-image that contributes to their utility.

Keywords: Dynamic game; Climate change; Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:211:y:2023:i:c:s0921800923001325

DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2023.107869

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