 Voluntary management of fisheries under the threat of uncertain legislationHubert Stahn Ecological Economics, 2026, vol. 239, issue C Abstract: In this paper, we examine the possibility for a regulator to reduce policy costs by substituting a voluntary policy based on a legislative threat to an active harvest control. Specifically, we focus on fisheries where the regulator aims to maintain an optimal level of conservation through a voluntary agreement. To achieve this, we identify a mandatory regulation that can serve as a threat to ensure voluntary compliance and avoid regulation costs. However, threats differ from effective policies. To be enforceable, they must be validated through a legislative process, the outcome of which is uncertain and subject to objections. Consequently, we introduce a random delay in its application and address social acceptability issues. This threat rests upon two pillars: a moratorium with financial compensation followed by an Individual Transferable Quota mechanism and a suitably chosen tax on harvesting capacity to deter deviations. We use data from the scallop fishery in the Bay of Saint-Brieuc (France) to illustrate this voluntary mechanism. Keywords: Voluntary agreements; Fisheries; Conservation policies; Dynamic games (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:239:y:2026:i:c:s0921800925002551 DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2025.108772 Access Statistics for this article Ecological Economics is currently edited by C. J. Cleveland More articles in Ecological Economics from Elsevier |
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