Water allocation by social choice rules: The case of sequential rules

Renan Goetz, Yolanda Martinez and Jofre Rodrigo

Ecological Economics, 2008, vol. 65, issue 2, 304-314

Abstract: This paper considers the problem of allocating shares of irrigation water to different agricultural agents with single-peaked preferences with respect to their own shares. We define two different sequential allocation rules that respect the asymmetry between the agents and maintain the properties of Pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness, and we design a specific algorithm to apply these rules. The results of the empirical application of these rules for the case of an irrigated area located in the Ebro Basin (Spain) show that the designed sequential rules are able to substantially improve the efficiency of the currently applied proportional rule in context of severe scarcity of water and/or high administrative water prices.

Date: 2008
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