Efficient decentralized fiscal and environmental policy: A dual purpose Henry George tax

Mitch Kunce and Jason Shogren

Ecological Economics, 2008, vol. 65, issue 3, 569-573

Abstract: One consequence of decentralized responsibility to set tax policy and environmental standards is that local governments might try to attract industry and jobs by underproviding local public goods with lower taxes or lax environmental standards or both. But if local authorities exploit fixed property site (i.e., land) taxation to fund local public goods, affect firm migration, and internalize potential local emission rents, herein we find decentralized efficiency is supported. This result reflects a dual form of the classic Henry George theorem previously overlooked.

Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921-8009(07)00431-4
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:65:y:2008:i:3:p:569-573

Access Statistics for this article

Ecological Economics is currently edited by C. J. Cleveland

More articles in Ecological Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().