Climate policy and ancillary benefits: A survey and integration into the modelling of international negotiations on climate change

Karen Pittel and Dirk Rübbelke

Ecological Economics, 2008, vol. 68, issue 1-2, 210-220

Abstract: Currently informal and formal international negotiations on climate change take place in an intensive way since the Kyoto Protocol expires already in 2012. A post-Kyoto regulation to combat global warming is not yet stipulated. Due to rapidly increasing greenhouse-gas emission levels, industrialized countries urge major polluters from the developing world like China and India to participate in a future agreement. Whether these developing countries will do so, depends on the prevailing incentives to participate in international climate protection efforts. This paper identifies ancillary benefits of climate policy to provide important incentives to attend a new international protocol and to positively affect the likelihood of accomplishing a post-Kyoto agreement which includes commitments of developing countries.

Keywords: Ancillary; benefits; Climate; change; International; negotiations; Chicken; game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (54)

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Working Paper: Climate policy and ancillary benefits: A survey and integration into the modelling of international negotiations on climate change (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:68:y:2008:i:1-2:p:210-220

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