A dynamic approach to voluntary environmental contributions in tourism

Ester Blanco, Javier Lozano and Javier Rey-Maquieira

Ecological Economics, 2009, vol. 69, issue 1, 104-114

Abstract: In an evolutionary game-theoretical model of tourism firms that use an endogenous natural Common Pool Resource (CPR) we show that stable equilibria with voluntary environmental initiatives may coexist with other equilibria where voluntary abatement is absent. The basins of attraction of the equilibria are identified and a bifurcation analysis is carried out producing two results with policy implications. First, there is a highly non-linear relationship between the cost of abatement required to be green and the share of green firms. Second, increases in the number of the CPR's users will ultimately dissipate the incentives to make abatement beyond regulation.

Keywords: Common-pool; resource; Voluntary; environmental; contributions; Evolutionary; framework; Sustainable; management; Tourism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:69:y:2009:i:1:p:104-114

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