The role of fairness norms the household-based natural forest conservation: The case of Wolong, China

Zhiyuan Song, Zhiyun Ouyang and Weihua Xu

Ecological Economics, 2012, vol. 84, issue C, 164-171

Abstract: The shadow of “the tragedy of the commons” with its popularized assumption of selfish individual behavior concerns policy-makers, and consequently the cooperative capability of local communities in common resource management is usually underrated. Nevertheless, here we propose a hypothesis, based on a game theory model, that the social norm of fairness rather than self-interest might motivate cooperation in natural resource conservation by discounting the utility gain from illegal logging at the cost of another household's subsidy loss. In Wolong Nature Reserve of China, a recent household-based natural forest conservation program has led to remarkable progress in protecting the habitat of giant pandas (Ailuropoda melanoleuca) with low monitoring pressure. We undertook experiments based on a one-shot Ultimatum Game to test the prevalence of the norm of fairness in the local communities. Most proposers in the experiments showed strong preferences for fair offers in spite of the responders' reluctance to reject low offers, and the result contradicted the expectation of pure self-interest. Taking into account the norm of fairness, the prediction of the model is consistent with the local performance of the household-based conservation policy. It highlights the potential of local social norms to facilitate participation and cooperation by the local community in common natural resource conservation.

Keywords: Social norm of fairness; Household-based forest conservation; Game theory; Ultimatum Game; Wolong (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:84:y:2012:i:c:p:164-171

DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.06.006

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