Transaction costs, collective action and adaptation in managing complex social–ecological systems

Graham Marshall

Ecological Economics, 2013, vol. 88, issue C, 185-194

Abstract: With the escalating uncertainties and surprises faced in responding to environmental and natural resource challenges has come growing recognition of the need to manage such issues as social–ecological systems and value the capacities that enable adaptation to these changes. Adaptations in environmental management often involve complex, including wicked, problems of collective action. Institutions introduced to reduce the transaction costs of solving these problems do not come for free.

Keywords: Institutions; Wicked problems; Adaptive governance; Institutional cost effectiveness; Path dependence; Precautionary principle; Heuristics; Murray–Darling Basin; Environmental water (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (52)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:88:y:2013:i:c:p:185-194

DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.12.030

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