A great fish war model with asymmetric players

Michèle Breton and Michel Yevenunye Keoula

Ecological Economics, 2014, vol. 97, issue C, 209-223

Abstract: This paper analyzes the coalitional Great Fish War model under the assumption that players differ in their time preferences and use different discount rates. We derive the equilibrium payoffs of this coalitional game and investigate the impact of the asymmetry assumption on the extreme schemes of cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria. We then proceed to the computation of stable coalitions using time-consistent harvest-sharing policies for the partial coordination scheme, in the case where players are divided into two groups (high and low discount rates). We find that asymmetry has a significant impact on the way the resource is shared and on the profitability of coalitions. We also find that asymmetry is not a sufficient feature to overcome the puzzle of small coalitions.

Keywords: Fishery management; Coalitional game; Asymmetry; Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800913003315
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:97:y:2014:i:c:p:209-223

DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.11.002

Access Statistics for this article

Ecological Economics is currently edited by C. J. Cleveland

More articles in Ecological Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().