On effective minimax payoffs and unequal discounting

Bo Chen ()

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 100, issue 1, 105-107

Abstract: We show that the folk theorem in Wen [Q. Wen (1994), The "Folk Theorem" for repeated games with complete information, Econometrica, 62, 949-954.] may not fully characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium payoff set in a repeated game with unequal discounting, where a player's equilibrium payoff could be strictly less than her effective minimax payoff.

Date: 2008
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