The effect of decisions under uncertainty on imperfect monitoring games

Shinichiro Takizawa

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 100, issue 2, 165-168

Abstract: The study of repeated games with Imperfect Public Information began with [Abreu, D., Pearce, D., Stacchetti, E., 1986. Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring, Journal of Economic Theory, 39, 251-269] using dynamic decomposition and was settled in [Fudenberg, D., Levine, D., Maskin, E., 1994. The folk theorem with imperfect public information, Econometrica, 62, 997-1039]. However, we suggest that if the effect of uncertainty and irreversibility are considered when punishment is exercised, the set of perfect public equilibria and their payoffs would change.

Date: 2008
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