Pre-empting technology competition through firm acquisitions

Christoph Grimpe and Katrin Hussinger

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 100, issue 2, 189-191

Abstract: This paper shows that firms engage in horizontal mergers and acquisitions to pre-empt competition in technology markets. Making use of the patent application procedure at the European Patent Office we introduce a measure for potential entry barriers in technology markets.

Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1765(08)00007-4
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Pre-empting Technology Competition Through Firm Acquisitions (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:2:p:189-191

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().