The social value of public information with costly information acquisition

Luca Colombo and Gianluca Femminis

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 100, issue 2, 196-199

Abstract: In a beauty contest framework, public authorities decide the accuracy of public information evaluating how it affects individual actions and private information acquisition. More precise public information increases welfare whenever its marginal cost does not exceed that of private information.

Date: 2008
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Working Paper: The Social Value of Public Information with Costly Information Acquisition (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:2:p:196-199

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