On the efficiency of a global market for carbon dioxide emission permits: Type of externality and timing of policymaking

Emilson Silva and Xie Zhu

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 100, issue 2, 213-216

Abstract: We demonstrate that global permit markets are Pareto efficient despite the externality type, production or consumption, when income redistribution occurs after regional environmental policymaking. Ex-ante income redistribution is neutral if emissions affect production only, but non-neutral if emissions affect consumption.

Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1765(08)00013-X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:2:p:213-216

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().