Announcements and credibility under inflation targeting

Banu Demir () and Taner Yigit

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 100, issue 2, 249-253

Abstract: We inspect how inflation target announcements are instrumental in building central bank credibility and shaping inflation expectations. Investigating the role of announcements by using a time varying credibility measure, we find that both the accuracy and the frequency of inflation announcements have a positive impact on how much attention the public pays to target announcements.

Date: 2008
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Working Paper: Announcements and Credibility under Inflation Targeting (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:2:p:249-253

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