On the stability of coalition structures

André Casajus

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 100, issue 2, 271-274

Abstract: We resolve a seeming conflict between a non-existence result on solutions to coalition formation in hedonic games [Barbera, S., Gerber, A., 2007. A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games. Economics Letters 95, 85-90] and the universal existence of stable coalition structures in TU games under the [chi]-value [Casajus, A., 2008. Outside options, component efficiency, and stability, Games and Economic Behavior (forthcoming). doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.04.003].

Date: 2008
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