Audited reputation

Hong Xu, Jianqing Chen and Andrew B. Whinston

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 100, issue 3, 359-362

Abstract: We study reputations with imperfect audit and a reputation market. The main result shows the existence of a separating equilibrium in the reputation market, which contrasts with Tadelis [Tadelis, S., 2002, The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism, Journal of Political Economy 110(4), 854-882].

Date: 2008
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