Moral hazard contracts: Does one size fit all?

Alexander Koch and Eloïc Peyrache

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 100, issue 3, 399-401

Abstract: We show that firms' practice of anonymous contracts ("one-size-fits-all") can be reconciled with standard agency theory if careers are marked by frequent transitions between employers, and agents have career concerns because complete long-term contracts are not feasible.

Date: 2008
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Related works:
Working Paper: Moral hazard contracts: Does one size fit all? (2008)
Working Paper: Moral Hazard Contracts: Does One Size Fit All? (2006)
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