Unobserved correlation in private-value ascending auctions

Daniel Quint

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 100, issue 3, 432-434

Abstract: In private-value ascending auctions, the winner's willingness to pay is not observed, leading to underidentification of many econometric models. I calculate tight bounds on expected revenue and optimal reserve price for the case of symmetric and affiliated private values.

Date: 2008
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