Bundling, information aggregation and entry deterrence

Jongchool Park and Kyoungwon Seo

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 101, issue 2, 100-102

Abstract: This paper provides an explanation for bundling based on its information aggregation effect. Using bundling, the monopolist can hide the information of each monopoly market by aggregating information. We show that the monopolist chooses bundling in an early period because bundling removes potential competition in the following period.

Keywords: Bundling; Entry; deterrence; Information; aggregation; Information; asymmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:101:y:2008:i:2:p:100-102

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