Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game

Ronald Peeters, Marc Vorsatz and Markus Walzl

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 101, issue 2, 148-150

Abstract: We conducted an experiment in which subjects played a sender-receiver game with and without rewarding opportunities. We find that rewards enhance the receiver's propensity to trust the sender's message but do not influence the sender's probability to tell the truth. Moreover, subjects who reward tell the truth and trust more often in the presence and absence of rewarding opportunities.

Keywords: Experiment; Rewards; Strategic; information; transmission (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Working Paper: Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:101:y:2008:i:2:p:148-150

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