Delegated contracting, information, and internal control

Wolfgang Gick

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 101, issue 3, 179-183

Abstract: This paper studies a particular form of internal control available to a (top) principal when delegating the offer of a Baron-Myerson style contract to an intermediary. We show that by examining the contract offered to the productive agent, the principal can reduce the loss of control.

Keywords: Delegated; contracting; Value; of; communication; Vertical; hierarchies; Internal; control; Agency; costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:101:y:2008:i:3:p:179-183

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