Private versus complete information in auctions

Florian Morath and Johannes Münster

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 101, issue 3, 214-216

Abstract: We show that, in several (but not all) standard auctions, (i) private independent values and (ii) complete information are payoff equivalent. The first-price auction generates the same revenue under (i) and (ii); the all-pay auction has lower revenue under (ii).

Keywords: Auctions; All-pay; auctions; War; of; attrition; Revenue; equivalence; Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:101:y:2008:i:3:p:214-216

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