Cournot and Bertrand-Edgeworth competition when rivals' costs are unknown

Jason J. Lepore

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 101, issue 3, 237-240

Abstract: We study a two-stage game with capacity precommitment followed by price competition where firms have incomplete information about their rival's marginal cost. The game has a Cournot outcome if and only if the lowest possible marginal cost is sufficiently high relative to the expected marginal cost.

Keywords: Bertrand-Edgeworth; Cournot; Consumer; rationing; Incomplete; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:101:y:2008:i:3:p:237-240

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