Applicant behaviour in patent examination request lags

Alfons Palangkaraya, Paul Jensen and Elizabeth Webster ()

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 101, issue 3, 243-245

Abstract: One component of the duration of pending patents - why applicants choose to delay the examination process - is modelled. We use a matched sample of 9597 patent applications to examine this issue. Controlling for differences between patent offices, we find evidence that applicants create investment uncertainty by delaying decisions to request patent examination.

Keywords: Patent; examinations; Patent; pendency; Investment; uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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