Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework

Patrick Schmitz

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 101, issue 3, 268-271

Abstract: A risk-neutral seller exerts effort while producing a good. The risk-neutral buyer can gather private information about his valuation. The ex ante optimal contract may encourage information gathering, although it is ex post efficient to trade regardless of the valuation.

Keywords: Information; gathering; Hold-up; problem; Complete; contracting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:101:y:2008:i:3:p:268-271

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