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Epsilon-Nash implementation

Mehmet Barlo () and Nuh Aygun Dalkiran ()

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 102, issue 1, 36-38

Abstract: This paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a social choice correspondence to be implementable via epsilon-Nash equilibrium when agents' preferences can be represented by cardinal utilities. Our results also display robustness of Maskin's seminal result on Nash implementation.

Keywords: Maskin-monotonicity; Implementation; Epsilon-Nash; equilibrium; Limited; veto; power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:102:y:2009:i:1:p:36-38