Mehmet Barlo () and
Nuh Aygun Dalkiran ()
Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 102, issue 1, 36-38
This paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a social choice correspondence to be implementable via epsilon-Nash equilibrium when agents' preferences can be represented by cardinal utilities. Our results also display robustness of Maskin's seminal result on Nash implementation.
Keywords: Maskin-monotonicity; Implementation; Epsilon-Nash; equilibrium; Limited; veto; power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:102:y:2009:i:1:p:36-38
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