Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition

Kai Konrad

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 102, issue 2, 109-111

Abstract: In a Stackelberg framework of capital income taxation it is shown that imposing a minimum tax rate that is lower than all countries' equilibrium tax rates in the unconstrained non-cooperative equilibrium may reduce equilibrium tax rates in all countries.

Keywords: Tax; competition; Minimum; tax; Tax; coordination; Stackelberg (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:102:y:2009:i:2:p:109-111

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