Private information in monopoly with random participation

Alexander Saak ()

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 102, issue 2, 67-69

Abstract: In a setting with random participation the seller achieves higher expected profits under intermediate private information when the heterogeneity in reservation utilities is not too small or too great.

Keywords: Monopoly; Private; information; Random; participation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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