Giving it now or later: Altruism and discounting

Jaromír Kovářík

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 102, issue 3, 152-154

Abstract: Postponing payments in the Dictator game, subjects allocate future payments between themselves and others. Since both payoffs of Dictators and Receivers are delayed equally, standard intertemporal utility maximization predicts no effect. Nevertheless, we observe negative effect of time on altruism.

Keywords: Altruism; Discounting; Dictator; game; Intertemporal; choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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Working Paper: Giving it now or later: altruism and discounting (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:102:y:2009:i:3:p:152-154

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