A note on optimal allocation mechanisms

Nicols Figueroa and Vasiliki Skreta

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 102, issue 3, 169-173

Abstract: When the buyer's utility is non-linear in type, revenue-maximizing mechanisms for multiple goods may be random. This happens when the allocation rule obtained via pointwise optimization is not incentive compatible, which is possible even with strictly increasing virtual utilities.

Keywords: Mechanism; design; Optimal; auctions; Bunching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: A Note on Optimal Allocation Mechanisms (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:102:y:2009:i:3:p:169-173

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