Sticks and carrots: Two incentive mechanisms supporting intra-group cooperation
Thorsten Janus () and
Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 102, issue 3, 177-180
In this note, we introduce two distinct incentive mechanisms that support dynamic intra-group cooperation in the context of prisoner's dilemma payoffs: rewards for cooperating, and punishments for defection, where the rewarding or punishing party may be outside the relationship.
Keywords: Intra-group; cooperation; Prisoner's; dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:102:y:2009:i:3:p:177-180
Access Statistics for this article
Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office
More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().