Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining

Philipp Wichardt, Daniel Schunk and Patrick Schmitz

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 103, issue 1, 33-35

Abstract: The data reported in this paper show that in an ultimatum mini-game rejection rates of low offers are significantly reduced if participation for responders is voluntary but costly. A possible explanation based on cognitive dissonance and loss aversion is offered.

Keywords: Cognitive; dissonance; Loss; aversion; Participation; costs; Sunk; costs; Ultimatum; game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:103:y:2009:i:1:p:33-35

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