Price sensitive prescribers

William Neilson

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 104, issue 1, 20-22

Abstract: When prescribers are not price sensitive, prescriptions segment the duopoly market and the unique dominant strategy equilibrium has both firms setting the monopoly price. When some prescribers are price sensitive, manufacturers use mixed strategies but still earn positive expected profit.

Keywords: Pharmaceutical; pricing; Textbook; pricing; Prescriptions; Monopoly; power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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