Simultaneous vs. sequential price competition with incomplete information
Leandro Arozamena () and
Federico Weinschelbaum ()
Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 104, issue 1, 23-26
We compare equilibria with sequential and simultaneous moves under homogeneous-good Bertrand competition when unit costs are private information. Under an alternative interpretation, we examine the consequences of awarding a right of first refusal in a first-price procurement auction with endogenous quantity.
Keywords: Oligopoly; Auctions; with; endogenous; quantity; Right; of; first; refusal; Second-mover; advantage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Simultaneous vs. Sequential Price Competition with Incomplete Information (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:104:y:2009:i:1:p:23-26
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