Simultaneous vs. sequential price competition with incomplete information

Leandro Arozamena and Federico Weinschelbaum

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 104, issue 1, 23-26

Abstract: We compare equilibria with sequential and simultaneous moves under homogeneous-good Bertrand competition when unit costs are private information. Under an alternative interpretation, we examine the consequences of awarding a right of first refusal in a first-price procurement auction with endogenous quantity.

Keywords: Oligopoly; Auctions; with; endogenous; quantity; Right; of; first; refusal; Second-mover; advantage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:104:y:2009:i:1:p:23-26

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