Why higher punishment may reduce deterrence

Eberhard Feess () and Ansgar Wohlschlegel

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 104, issue 2, 69-71

Abstract: Assuming that the willingness to find a potentially innocent defendant guilty is decreasing in punishments, we derive two results: Deterrence is decreasing when punishments are too high, and deterrence maximizing punishments tend to increase in the quality of legal systems.

Keywords: Deterrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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