On revenue and welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes in two-sided markets

Hans Jarle Kind, Marko Koethenbuerger and Guttorm Schjelderup

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 104, issue 2, 86-88

Abstract: A benchmark result in public economics is that it is possible to increase both tax revenue and welfare by making a monopoly subject to ad valorem taxes rather than unit taxes. We show that such revenue and welfare dominance does not hold in two-sided markets.

Keywords: Ad; valorem; taxes; Unit; taxes; Two-sided; markets; Revenue-dominance; Welfare-dominance; Monopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Related works:
Working Paper: On Revenue and Welfare Dominance of Ad Valorem Taxes in Two-Sided Markets (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:104:y:2009:i:2:p:86-88

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