A restriction on lobbyist donations

Brendan Kline

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 104, issue 3, 129-132

Abstract: This paper studies the consequences of a fine for violating a ceiling on permissible donations in a competition for a political prize. Increasing the fine can increase or decrease the amount of expected donations in equilibrium.

Keywords: Lobbying; All-pay; auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:104:y:2009:i:3:p:129-132

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