Endogenous political competition and political accountability

Miltiadis Makris

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 104, issue 3, 151-153

Abstract: We contribute to the debate over the effectiveness of elections in motivating incumbents to perform well. We show that with endogenous political competition the effectiveness of democracy in disciplining officials can be largely diminished.

Keywords: Political; competition; Retrospective; voting; Citizen-candidate; Rent-seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:104:y:2009:i:3:p:151-153

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