How to subcontract?

Achim Wambach

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 105, issue 2, 152-155

Abstract: Firms compete for a contract and subcontract part of the work. If subcontracting takes place before the award of the contract, the revenue equivalence result breaks down, as subcontractors anticipate that their bids influence the probability of the firm winning the contract. Properties of the optimal subcontracting mechanism are discussed.

Keywords: Auction; Procurement; Bidding; Subcontracting; Revenue; equivalence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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