Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: Two examples

David Malueg () and Ram Orzach

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 105, issue 2, 177-180

Abstract: When players' affiliated values are symmetrically distributed, expected revenue in the second-price auction equals or exceeds that in the first-price auction (Milgrom and Weber, 1982). We provide two common-value examples where this ranking fails when players are asymmetrically informed.

Keywords: First-price; auction; Second-price; auction; Revenue; comparison (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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