Who benefits from a sender's credibility concern, the sender or a receiver?

Hanjoon Jung ()

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 105, issue 3, 204-207

Abstract: In an information transmission situation, a sender's concern for its credibility could endow itself with an invisible power to control a receiver's decision so that the sender can manipulate information without being detected. The current paper models this paradoxical role of the sender's credibility concern.

Keywords: Anti-coordination; game; Credibility; Information; transmission; Hawk-Dove; game; Paradox (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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