Transparency and special interests

Mike Felgenhauer

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 106, issue 1, 4-7

Abstract: In this paper opposing lobbies influence a politician via contributions. Society may grant access to decision relevant information. Transparency maximizes welfare if the lobbies have a similar size. Secrecy is optimal if their size is comparable, but not too similar.

Keywords: Bribes; Corruption; Common; agency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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